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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone loves energy efficiency. Among an array of carbon-reducing
strategies, energy efficiency surely ranks as the least controversial.
Indeed, increasing energy efficiency is frequently lauded as having “net
negative costs”—to use the terminology of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change—meaning that the benefits outweigh the costs, even
excluding benefits from avoided climate change.1

* Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law and Faculty Director, Emmett
Center on Climate Change and the Environment, UCLA School of Law. An earlier
version of this article appeared online in 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63
(2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/carlson.htm (2008).
I thank Jonathan Zasloff for insightful comments on an earlier draft, Danae McElroy for
superb research assistance, Lesley McAllister and the San Diego Journal of Climate &
Energy Law for inviting me to their outstanding inaugural symposium, and the editorial
staff of the Journal.
1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 58 n.22 (2007).
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Yet the U.S. system for regulating appliances, which account for a
huge percentage of the nation’s carbon emissions,2 is a mess. Since the
federal government began regulating appliance efficiency in the 1970s,
the process has been characterized by frequent delays and foot-dragging,
followed by lawsuits and legislative overhauls. Amidst the turmoil, a
number of states have attempted to assert leadership in setting appliance
standards but have often faced federal roadblocks in so doing. I suggest
that a reallocation of regulatory authority to parallel our system of auto
emissions regulation is in order.
II. ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CARBON EMISSIONS
Energy efficiency can include any number of policy strategies, such as
setting tougher building standards, reducing transmission line leakage,
and improving the efficiency of consumer and commercial products like
air conditioners and computers. The savings in carbon emissions from
adopting these strategies could be astoundingly large; buildings in the
United States, for example, are responsible for 10% of worldwide
emissions. Close to 60% of U.S. commercial building emissions and
75% of residential building emissions come from appliances, including
water heaters, air conditioners, heaters, refrigerators, and electronics.3
Another 28% of commercial emissions and 13% of residential emissions
come from lighting,4 which is regulated together with appliances under
federal law. Thus, more than 85% of commercial and residential
emissions come from appliances and lighting.5 The charts in Figure 1
below illustrate the sources of building emissions by commercial and
residential sectors, respectively.

2. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY
REPORTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8, 17 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads/08_ES.pdf.
3. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY, 2005 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK 3-1, 3-1 to 3-4 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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FIGURE 1. U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS FROM BUILDINGS,
BY END USE
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In the long run, a shift to alternative energy sources that emit no
carbon would dramatically reduce emissions from buildings. But in the
near and medium term, improvements in the energy efficiency of
appliances may achieve more reductions at less cost. Moreover, unless
the U.S. economy moves entirely away from fossil fuels as an energy
source, energy efficiency can and should play a central role in stabilizing
or reducing overall energy demand. Even if we replace our entire
energy stock with renewable fuels, making appliances that reduce the
use of those fuels is surely a laudable goal.
III. FEDERALISM AND APPLIANCE STANDARDS
California first began regulating appliance standards in the 1970s,6
and New York, Florida, and Kansas quickly followed.7 These states
regulated appliance standards in order to overcome a market failure:
appliances are often purchased not by those who will pay utility bills
(renters/lessees of commercial and residential property and owners of
new homes) but by developers and landlords, whose incentives are to
purchase appliances with the cheapest initial cost rather than those that
provide long term energy savings.8
In response to state regulatory activity in setting appliance standards,
the federal government stepped in. In 1978, Congress enacted legislation
that, in large measure, preempts states from adopting their own standards
if the federal government has adopted a standard for the product at
issue.9 States can apply for a waiver of preemption requirements for
products with federal standards,10 but to date, the Department of Energy
(DOE) has rejected the only waiver request that has been submitted—
California’s 2006 petition for a waiver for residential clothes washers.11
6. HOWARD GELLER, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY,
NATIONAL APPLIANCE EFFICIENCY STANDARDS: COST EFFECTIVE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
1 (1995), available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/a951.htm.
7. STEVEN NADEL ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY,
LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND
EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 2 (2006), available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/
a062.htm.
8. For an extensive analysis of market failures and various energy using devices,
see generally Mark D. Levine et al., Energy Efficiency Policy and Market Failures, 20
ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 535 (1995).
9. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3264
(1978).
10. Id.
11. NADEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 50; see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Appliances and
Commercial Equipment Standards: State Petitions, www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance
_standards/state_petitions.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). California has requested
reconsideration of the DOE denial. See CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, PETITION FOR
E XEMPTION FROM F EDERAL P REEMPTION OF C ALIFORNIA ’ S W ATER C ONSERVATION
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The standards for a waiver of preemption requirements are tough to
meet. Under the Energy Policy Act, a state needs to show that more
stringent state regulation is necessary to meet “unusual and compelling
State or local energy or water interests” that “are substantially different
in nature or magnitude than those prevailing in the United States
generally.”12 States must also seek a waiver to regulate products that
lack federal standards, but generally speaking, the DOE has granted such
waivers liberally. Essentially then, we have federal standards for major
appliances (central air conditioning, heat pumps, furnaces, boilers,
refrigerators, freezers, washers, dryers, ovens dishwashers, etc.) and
state standards for less significant appliances (hot tubs, pool pumps,
compact audio products, and DVD players, to name a few).13
Federal preemption of appliance standards is not problematic if federal
authority is used effectively. If the aim of federal regulation is to
promote improved energy efficiency, however, the federal government’s
track record to date is not promising. Over the past forty years, federal
performance on appliance standards has often included delay in
implementing enabling legislation followed by litigation, grudging
compliance, and the adoption of relatively weak standards. Weak
standards obviously produce fewer energy savings and, hence, fewer
greenhouse gas emissions reductions than stronger standards. Delay in
the context of climate change has clear significance given the long shelf
life of various greenhouse gases—100 years for carbon dioxide, for
example14—and the resulting accumulation of gases in the atmosphere.
Federal foot-dragging in setting appliance standards began in the late
1970s and early 1980s.15 The National Energy Conservation Policy Act,
passed in 1978, mandated energy efficiency standards for thirteen
appliances if the regulations could be economically justified.16 In 1982,
the DOE announced that it would not issue any standards.17 In NRDC v.
STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL CLOTHES WASHERS, DOE Docket Number EE-RM-PET100 2 (2007), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/cec_reconsi
deration_request.pdf.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d)(1) (2007).
13. Appliance Standards Awareness Project, Federal Standards, http://www.standards
asap.org/federal.htm (last visited October 19, 2009).
14. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 137 (2001).
15. GELLER, supra note 6.
16. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
17. Julia Richardson & Robert Nordhaus, The National Energy Act of 1978, 10SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 62, 86 (1995).
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Herrington, the D.C. Circuit overturned the DOE’s regulatory
declination.18
In the meantime, since the DOE had a general policy to approve state
waiver requests in the absence of federal standards, several states
stepped in to regulate, including California, New York, Florida,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts.19 The flurry of state legislative activity
led to manufacturers again clamoring for national standards and federal
preemption.20 The Natural Resources Defense Council worked with
appliance trade groups to pass the National Appliance Energy Conservation
Act (NAECA) in 1987.21 The NAECA set appliance standards statutorily
for a number of residential appliances rather than relying on the DOE to
set them.22 However, many appliances remained without standards, so
the pattern has repeated itself several times. States issue standards for
appliances omitted in federal legislation, then Congress preempts those
standards in legislation, as it did in the 1992 Energy Policy Act23 and
again in the 2005 Energy Policy Act.24 Pending legislation introduced in
the current Congressional session includes new provisions to preempt
state standards for various types of lighting, water dispensers, and
several other smaller appliances.25
The pattern of state regulation followed by federal preemption poses
at least two potential problems. First, the federal government frequently
sets standards at levels lower than seems appropriate when balancing
energy savings with increased manufacturing costs. Second, manufacturers
may be faced with competing state standards as well as the prospect of
manufacturing separate products for a number of different markets
around the country.

18. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1433.
19. GELLER, supra note 6.
20. Martin Tolchin, An Industry Asks for Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1987,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/17/us/washington-talk-an-industry-asksfor-regulation.html?scp=1&sq=An%20Industry%20Asks%20for%20Regulation&st=cse.
21. Air Condition. & Refrig. Inst. v. Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 410
F.3d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 2005).
22. National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 (NAECA), Pub. L. No.
100-12, 101 Stat. 103 (1987).
23. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-468, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
24. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
25. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECTION-BY-SECTION ON DISCUSSION
DRAFT OF “THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009” at 4,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090331/acesa_sectionsummary.pdf. This is
precisely the prediction that Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian made in their important 1985
article. See generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution:
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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IV. LAX APPLIANCE STANDARDS AND DELAYS IN PROMULGATION
The federal government’s decision to issue no efficiency standards in
1982 is only one instance of federal inaction. In 2005, fifteen states sued
the DOE for failing to upgrade efficiency standards for twenty-two
separate appliances.26 As of 2006, the DOE was behind schedule in
setting new standards by as many as thirteen years.27 President Obama
has made appliance standards an important part of his energy plan and
has directed the DOE to complete standards that can produce the largest
amount of energy savings ahead of schedule.28 Nevertheless, the
historical track record of the DOE has hardly been inspired—the General
Accountability Office found in a 2007 report that the department had
never met a statutory deadline for setting appliance efficiency standards.29
The DOE has also been subject to political pushes and pulls in
standard-setting.30 For example, the Clinton Administration adopted a
Seasonal Energy Efficient Ratio (SEER) 13 standard for all new air
conditioning equipment as of January 2006, an increase from the
existing SEER 10 standard.31 In 2001, the Bush Administration
announced it was rolling back the standard to SEER 12, despite the
position of its own Environmental Protection Agency that the rollback
was based on a DOE analysis that both overstated the costs of the SEER
13 standard and underestimated the resulting savings.32 In 2004, the
Second Circuit found the Bush Administration’s promulgation of the
26. Consent Decree at 2-5, State of New York, et al. v. Dep’t of Energy, No. 7807
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006).
27. Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General Announces Federal
Government Agrees to Tougher Appliance Energy Efficiency Standards (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2426&Q=327996.
28. For a description of the current status of proposed federal standards
and President Obama’s position on appliance standard deadlines, see generally AM.
COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY, KA-BOOM! THE POWER OF APPLIANCE
STANDARDS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW FEDERAL APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT STANDARDS
(2009), http://www.standardsasap.org/documents/Ka-BOOM!%20Executive%20Summary.pdf.
29. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: LONG-STANDING
PROBLEMS WITH DOE’S PROGRAM FOR SETTING EFFICIENCY STANDARDS CONTINUE TO
RESULT IN FORGONE ENERGY SAVINGS 5 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0742.pdf.
30. See NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 184-191 (2d Cir. 2004); Ann E.
Carlson, Heat Waves, Global Warming, and Mitigation, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
169, 211-212 (2007).
31. Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Air Conditioner Efficiency
Standards: SEER 13 vs. SEER 12, http://www.eesi.org/030602_SEER_13 (last visited
Oct. 19, 2009).
32. Id.
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SEER 12 standard invalid in NRDC v. Abraham,33 and the SEER 13
standard took effect January 1, 2007. The difference between the two
standards is huge: the SEER 13 standard will reduce energy usage
equivalent to the annual energy use of twenty-six million U.S.
households (4.2 quads of energy) over twenty-five years versus only
three quads of energy under the SEER 12 standard.34 Further, the higher
SEER standard will reduce 25% more smog-forming metric tons of
nitrous oxides and carbon than the SEER 12 standard.
V. MULTIPLICITY OF STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL PRODUCT MARKETS
A byproduct of the federal government’s failure to enact standards for
certain appliances is that multiple states can step in to fill the regulatory
void.35 The result can mean a patchwork of state standards for numerous
products.
Even proponents of a strong state role in environmental policymaking
advocate federal preemption for the regulation of products for which
there is a national market, such as appliances. The argument in favor of
national standards is twofold. First, without national standards, states
can shift the costs of regulation outside their jurisdictional boundaries.36
For instance, an appliance manufacturer in Michigan may bear many of
the costs of regulation imposed by Massachusetts. Second, national
product manufacturers enjoy economies of scale in producing the same
products for consumers in all fifty states.37 Multiple state regulations not
only eliminate this advantage but also likely increase compliance costs.
Industry frequently looks to Congress to preempt state laws in favor of
national legislation following a flurry of state regulatory activity. This is
precisely the pattern that has repeated itself several times with respect to
appliance standards.38
Certainly, there are counterarguments to those made in favor of
national preemption. Empirical evidence of more stringent auto
emissions regulations in California suggests that residents of the state,
rather than manufacturers, bear the financial burden of their cleaner

33. Abraham, 355 F.3d at 197-206.
34. Environmental and Energy Study Institute, supra note 31.
35. See NADEL ET AL., supra note 7, at iii.
36. Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism
and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 397, 418-19 (2008); see Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,
95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 624-25 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 544 (1997).
38. NADEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 2-3.
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technology.39 The argument that manufacturers will face fifty separate
emission standards absent federal legislation also seems overstated.
States often piggyback on one another’s standards,40 and few states in
the country have market shares large enough to impose separate
regulations with confidence that manufacturers will continue to serve
their states. Delaware is not California.
In the context of appliance standards not covered by federal standards,
some states jump into the regulatory void to enact their own standards.
Most states, however, simply follow California’s lead and enact
California standards.41 Nevertheless, they are not required to follow
California’s lead, and there is no process for harmonizing state
regulations to minimize regulatory multiplicity.
VI. CALIFORNIA AS REGULATORY LEADER
We have several problems, then, with our current system of appliance
standards regulation. The federal government has frequently dragged its
feet in issuing national standards, and the standards it has issued are
often weaker than they could be to achieve significant energy savings at
manageable cost. And for those appliances where no federal standards
exist, multiple states jump in and sometimes issue different regulations
for the same product. Moreover, many appliances remain subject to no
regulation in states that choose not to regulate.
We frequently view our regulatory options in environmental
policymaking as 1) federal regulation, 2) state devolution, or 3) some
hybrid of cooperative federalism where the federal government sets
minimum standards and states implement those standards while taking
local conditions into account. With respect to automobile emissions
standards under the Clean Air Act (CAA),42 however, we use a fourth
option. Under the CAA, California has special regulatory authority to
issue emissions standards that are at least as protective of public health

39. See Daniel Sperling et al., Analysis of Auto Industry and Consumer Response
to Regulations and Technological Change, and Customization of Consumer Response
Models in Support of AB 1493 Rulemaking (June 1, 2004).
40. See NADEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; STEVEN NADEL, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN
ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY, APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS: HISTORY,
IMPACTS, CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 (1996), http://www.aceee.org/
pubs/a963.htm.
41. NADEL ET AL., supra note 7.
42. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2008).
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and welfare as federal standards.43 All other states are preempted from
regulating auto emissions, but they can opt into the California standards.44
As a result, about one-third of the country drives “California cars” and
the remainder drives “federal cars.”
This unique scheme of federalism—what I’ve elsewhere called
“iterative federalism”—has achieved remarkable reductions in pollutants
from cars.45 To take one example, California cars are more than 99%
cleaner than they were in 1970.46 Moreover, the California experience
has allowed the state to take policy risks that, if successful, can be and
have been exported to the rest of the country. Indeed, over the course of
the forty-two years since California was first granted its “superregulator” status, the federal government has followed California’s
regulatory lead on at least ten separate occasions.47 The California
provision allows for the best of centralization and decentralization: the
state serves as a laboratory of democracy while endorsing industry’s
desire to avoid multiple state standards.
Why not adopt a similar regulatory scheme for the regulation of
appliance standards? As long as California adopts standards at least as
stringent as federal standards, the state should be allowed to regulate all
appliances, not just those without federal standards. States that wish to
follow California’s regulatory lead should be allowed to opt in, just as
they can choose to follow California’s auto emissions standards. States
other than California should be preempted from issuing their own standards.
The country can then gain the benefits of policy experimentation and
leadership while avoiding overlapping and potentially conflicting state
standards.
Why California? The state has a long history of regulating in this
area—a history that predates federal regulation—and is the de facto
regulatory leader for appliances not subject to federal standards. Thus, it
already possesses the regulatory capacity and expertise to take on the
role. Moreover, the state obviously has a large enough consumer market
to ensure that manufacturers will continue to serve Californians.
Congress should provide California with special status to regulate
appliance standards whether or not it passes an economy-wide cap-and-

43. 42 U.S.C. § 7543.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
45. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1097 (2009).
46. Kelly Zito, Not All Share in Bay Area’s Cleansing Air, S AN F RANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 17, 2008, available at http://www.sfchron.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f
=/c/a/2008/10/17/BABE13CBGO.DTL.
47. See Carlson, supra note 45, at 1110-28.
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trade scheme to regulate carbon emissions.48 In theory, such a scheme
should raise energy prices enough to encourage appliance manufacturers
to increase the energy efficiency of their products. In practice, though,
the same market failure that led to appliance standards in the first
place—a disconnect between those who buy appliances and those who
pay their long term energy costs—will likely interfere with price signals
sent by a carbon cap-and-trade system. Instead, Congress should allow
California to set standards more stringent than federal law in order to
encourage policy innovation that, if successful, can ultimately be
exported to the rest of the country.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tackling climate change will require regulatory innovation across
sectors and across levels of government, from cities to states to the
federal government to international organizations. Appliance-efficiency
regulation is an area that has largely escaped scholarly attention, yet it
holds the promise of significant carbon reductions at a cost savings.
Locating regulatory power in both the federal government and California
magnifies the likelihood of maximizing these savings.

48. President Obama has proposed a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce carbon
emissions as have leading members of Congress. See The White House, Energy &
Environment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy_and_environment (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009). The leading House proposal is contained in the American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009, introduced by Representatives Henry Waxman and Edward
Markey. The Waxman-Markey bill passed the House of Representatives in June of
2009. See http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=1633&catid=155&Itemid=55 for the text of the bill as passed by the House. Senators
Barbara Boxer and John Kerry introduced a Senate bill containing a cap-and-trade
program, The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, in September 2009. See
U.S. Senate Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works., Kerry, Boxer Introduce Clean Energy Jobs
and American Power Act Sept. 30, 2009, http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Majority.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=0c00344c-802a-23ad-4f4d-db0c940
8d2e.
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